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WISCONSIN CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD
PROBLEMS*
PAUL P. LIPTON** AND RICHARD A. PETRIE***
Since the establishment of the Intelligence Section by the Depart-
ment of Taxation in 1961, representation in non-filing cases and those
involving substantial understatements of income has taken on com-
plexities that once were important only in federal tax investigations.
Previously, the taxpayer's representative was concerned almost ex-
clusively with the civil aspects of such cases. Criminal prosecution now
is a real threat and the techniques of representation must be appraised
accordingly.
As an introduction to this recently activated area of law, this article
will review the Wisconsin criminal sanctions, the policies and pro-
cedures of the Intelligence Section, and the rights and privileges of
the taxpayer under criminal investigation.
Criminal Sanctions
The principal criminal sanctions for income tax offenses are found
in sections 71.11(42) and 71.11(43) of the Wisconsin statutes. The
former provides that any person other than a corporation who fails or
refuses to make a return at the time prescribed by law, or who renders
a false or fraudulent return, may be fined not more than $500, im-
prisoned not more than one year, or both.' The latter section imposes
similar punishment upon any corporate officer who, with intent to
defeat or evade assessment or collection of tax, makes a false or fraud-
ulent return, statement, deposit report, or withholding report.2 These
tax offenses constitute felonies. 3
* This article is based on a lecture given at the Fourteenth Annual Marquette
University Institute on Taxation.
**Attorney (Wisconsin; Massachusetts) ; formerly, Special Attorney and
Trial Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service.
***Attorney (Wisconsin); associate, Paul P. Lipton, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
2Wis. STAT. § 71.11(42) (1961): "Any person, other than a corporation, who
fails or refuses to make a return at the time hereinbefore specified in each
year or shall render a false or fraudulent return shall upon conviction be
fined not to exceed $500, or be imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both,
at the discretion of the court, together with the cost of prosecution."
2 Wis. STAT. § 71.11(43) (1961) : "Any officer of a corporation required by law
to make, render, sign or verify any return, statement, deposit report or
withholding report who makes any false or fraudulent return, statement,
deposit report or withholding report with intent to defeat or evade any as-
sessment or collection required by this chapter to becmade, shall upon con-
viction be fined not to exceed $500 or be imprisoned not to exceed one year,
or both, at the discretion of the court, together with the cost of prosecution."
3 Wis. STAT. §§ 939.60, 959.044 (1961).
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The statute of limitations bars prosecution after the lapse of six
years from the time of commission of the offense.4 In non-filing cases,
the statute undoubtedly runs from the last day prescribed by law for
filing. With respect to rendering or making a false or fraudulent re-
turn, the statute presumably runs from the date the return is filed, even
though the filing is earlier or later than required by law. Wisconsin
law differs in this respect from the Internal Revenue Code, which pro-
vides that a return filed before the due date is deemed to have been
filed on the last date prescribed by law for filing.' The Wisconsin
statutes do contain a similar provision for purposes of the civil assess-
ment, but it is not applicable to criminal offenses.6
Criminal Intent
Section 71.11(42) is silent with respect to the element of criminal
intent. Nevertheless, proof of willful conduct undoubtedly is essential
to conviction inasmuch as the offenses described therein are felonies.
7
In the case of failure to file a return, the state must establish that
the taxpayer knew he had an obligation to file a tax return and that
he failed to do so without justifiable excuse.8 Mere accidental, inad-
vertent, or negligent failure to file clearly would not justify application
of the criminal sanction. The statute probably requires proof of an
evil motive or bad purpose, but this may not encompass a showing that
the taxpayer intended to evade payment of the tax.9
Intent to evade payment of the tax unquestionably is essential to
4Wis. STAT. § 939.74(1) (1961) : "Except as provided in sub. (2), prosecution
for a felony must be commenced within 6 years . . . after the commission
thereof. Within the meaning of this section, a prosecution has commenced
when a warrant or summons is issued, an indictment is found, or an in-
formation is filed." The statute of limitations runs from the time of com-
mission of these tax crimes, rather than from the time of discovery thereof.
25 Ops. Wis. Ar'y GEN. 237 (1936).
S INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6513 (a), is made applicable to criminal prosecutions
by § 6531. The validity of this provision is questionable, but it has been upheld
thus far. See United States v. Scheetz, CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(64-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 59280 (S.D. Ind. 1963).
6 Wis. STAT.§ 71.11(21) (h) (1961).
7 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); 22 C.J.S. Crininal
Law §§ 29, 30 (1961). In a prosecution for failure to file Wisconsin income
tax returns, the trial judge declared that § 71.11(42) was applicable only to
"flagrant situations where criminal intent is involved." Brief for Defendant,
p. 7, State v. Roggensack, 15 Wis. 2d 625, 113 N.W. 2d 389 (1962).
s For the law in federal cases, see Yarborough v. United States, 230 F. 2d
56 (4th Cir. 1956); United States v. Cirillo, 251 F. 2d 638 (3d Cir. 1957);
Abdul v. United States, 254 F. 2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958); Haner v. United
States, 315 F. 2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963).
9 Under the federal cases, note 8 supra, the bad purpose required means only
that the omissions were voluntary, purposeful, deliberate, and intentional,
rather than accidental, inadvertent or negligent. Conceivably, the burden rest-
ing upon the state might be greater because the offense is a felony under
Wisconsin law, but only a misdemeanor under federal law. TNT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 7203.
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conviction on a charge of filing a false individual or corporate return.10
Although section 71.11(42) does not explicitly impose any such re-
quirement, the use of the word "fraudulent" necessarily implies an in-
tent to evade the tax. Section 71.11(43), which punishes the filing of a
false corporate return, does state specifically that the filing of a false
or fraudulent corporate return must be accompanied by an intent to
evade the tax.
The "Roggensack" Case
The supreme court recently upheld the validity of section 71.11(42)
against an attack that it was in conflict with section 71.11(41). Both
sections proscribe the same conduct, but the latter section provides
only a monetary penalty not exceeding $5,000.11 In State v. Roggen-
sack,1 2 the taxpayer had been convicted of failure to file income tax
returns in violation of section 71.11 (42). He contended that this section
was unconstitutional because it permitted the state to choose which
criminal sanction it would impose, thereby violating the constitutional
requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. The
court held that section 71.11(41) prescribes merely a civil forfeiture,
whereas section 71.11(42) constitutes a criminal sanction. The court
found that there was no conflict between the sections and thereby
avoided the constitutional questions.
Venue
Venue for purposes of a criminal prosecution lies in the county
where the offense was committed.' 3 The supreme court has held that
the offense of filing a false return is committed in the county where
the return was required to be filed.14 The complaint in that case had
been dismissed by the Circuit Court for Dane County on the ground
that the offense had been committed in the county where the return
was prepared.
Under federal law, venue in a tax evasion prosecution may lie
where the return has been filed or in the district where the return
was prepared. 5 Perhaps the same rule should apply under Wisconsin
2o The section prescribing the double-rate civil penalty specifies the element of
"intent . .. to defeat or evade the income tax assessment." Wis. STAT. §
71.11(6) (1961). See Platon v. Department of Taxation, 264 Wis. 254, 58
N.W. 2d 712 (1953).
11 Wis. STAT. § 71.11(41) (1961): "If any person fails or refuses to make a
return at the time or times hereinbefore specified in each year . . . or renders
a false or fraudulent return, statement, deposit report, withholding report
or declaration of estimated income tax, such person shall be liable to a penalty
of not less than $100 and not to exceed $5,000, at the discretion of the court."
12 15 Wis. 2d 625, 113 N.W. 2d 389 (1962).
13 Wis. STAT. § 956.01 (1) (1961).
14 State ex rel. Arthur v. Proctor, 255 Wis. 355, 38 N.W. 2d 505 (1949).
15 See the discussion and cases cited in BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EvAsioN § 122(3d ed. 1963).
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law. The supreme court apparently did not recognize the possibility
that venue might lie in more than one county,' and need only have
decided that the Circuit Court for Dane County had jurisdiction be-
cause the return had been filed there.
A prosecution for failure to file may be brought only in the county
where the return should have been filed.' 7 The statute requires that
corporations furnish the "department of taxation" with a true and
correct statement of facts necessary to enforce the provisions of the
income tax law.'8 The Administrative Code expressly provides that
corporate returns shall be filed at Madison in Dane County. 19 In the
case of individuals, however, the statute requires that income be re-
ported "to the assessor of incomes, in the manner and form prescribed
by the department of taxation. ' 20 Contrary to prior procedure,21 the
1963 individual income tax blanks specify that returns are to be filed
with the Department at Madison. Pending statutory clarification, there
will be considerable uncertainty regarding venue in tax prosecutions,
both in non-filing and evasion cases.
The Intelligence Section
The Intelligence Section was established by the Commissioner of
Taxation in 1961 pursuant to the authority granted by section 73.02
(3).22 It was organized for the purpose of enforcing the criminal
sanctions of the income and sales tax laws. The Section is staffed by
trained special agents who work under the supervision of a Director.
The nature and purpose of an investigation by the Intelligence Sec-
tion hae been described by the former Director as follows :23
[E]very audit that is being performed by a special agent is
being performed for the purpose of ascertaining whether a crime
has been committed as well as to determine the correct taxable
16 WIS. STAT. § 956.01(10) (1961) provides that where "several acts are requisite
to the commission of a crime, it may be prosecuted in any county in which
any of such acts occurred."
'_ For federal authority, see Yarborough v. United States, supra note 8, and
cases cited therein.
I8Wis. STAT. § 71.10(1) (1961).
'9 Wis. AD. CODE, TAX § 2.03 (1960).
20 WIS. STAT. § 71.10(2) (1961).
21 The Administrative Code provides that returns of individuals shall be filed
in the office of the assessor of incomes for the district in which the individual
resides. Wis. ADM. CODE, TAX § 208 (1960). Neither this rule nor the statute has
been amended to impose any requirement that tax returns be filed with the
Department at Madison. The assessment districts and the location of the
assessors' offices are set forth in Wis. ADM. CODE, TAX § 101 (1956).
22 WIs. STAT. § 73.02(3) (1961): "The department of taxation shall consist
of the following divisions:...
(i) Such other divisions as may be found necessary by the commissioner
for the effective administration of the department.
(j) The commissioner may allocate and reallocate functions, powers and
duties among the divisions within the department, except the division
of beverage and cigarette taxes."
23 Corning, Procedures of the Intelligence Section of the Wisconsin Department
of Taxation, 36 Wis. B. BULL. 15 (1963).
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income. It is apparent, therefore, that when a special agent enters
an audit the character of the audit changes from a routine audit
to an investigation to obtain evidence of the commission of a
crime.
Prosecution Policies
In the fifty years prior to the establishment of the Intelligence
Section, the criminal sanctions of the Wisconsin income tax law were
rarely invoked.24 Although no conclusive statistics are available, only
a handful of cases were prosecuted.2 5 This was and is typical of the
administration of the criminal provisions of the income tax laws of
other states. Today, there are indications of concerted enforcement
efforts only in Wisconsin 26 and perhaps two other states.2 7
Criminal prosecutions in non-filing cases have been limited to in-
stances where the defendant has ignored one or more requests to file
delinquent returns. The prosecution of truly recalcitrant individuals
contrasts significantly with the policy of the Internal Revenue Service.
The non-filing federal taxpayer is afforded no opportunity to avoid
prosecution by filing late.
There have not been a sufficient number of criminal prosecutions,
apart from non-filing cases, to provide any insight into the standards
employed by the Department in selecting cases for criminal action. The
only available enlightenment is the statement by the former Director
that the majority of the cases investigated by the Intelligence Section
are not prosecuted because the offense is not sufficiently flagrant or
because the state would be unable to meet the burden of proof implicit
in a criminal case.
2 8
The enforcement history prior to establishment of the Intelligence
Section suggests that the Department initially should prosecute only
the most flagrant cases, at least with respect to pre-1961 returns. When
Wisconsin taxpayers have had fair warning that the criminal sanctions
are being invoked, it might be appropriate to lower the standards some-
what. Criminal prosecution, however, should always be reserved for
cases involving substantial evasion. Most taxpayers who resort to petty
chiselling do not realize that their acts may constitute a criminal offense,
24 The Wisconsin income tax law, including the criminal sanctions, was enacted
in 1911. Wis. Laws 1911, ch. 658.
25 Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 7, 1962, quoting the Commissioner of the Department
to the effect that "only half a dozen cases had been tried." See, in this con-
nection, State ex tel Marachowsky v. Kerl, 258 Wis. 309, 45 N.W. 2d 668
(1951).
26 In the first thirteen months after the establishment of the Intelligence Sec-
tion in 1961, fifty-nine court complaints were filed against persons for failure
to file, and in one instance, for filing a fraudulent return. The maximum
sentence imposed in these cases was sixty days in jail and the maximum fine
was $500. Milwaukee Journal, April 25, 1962. In January, 1962, a seventy-four
year old liquor jobber was found guilty of filing a false and fradulent return
for 1956 and was fined $500. Milwaukee Journal, Jan. 5, 1962.
27 California and New York, apparently.
28 Corning, supra note 23, at 17.
1964]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
and few are motivated by the bad purpose essential to conviction of
a felony. Since it will be impossible to detect all violations, the stigma
of a felony charge should be imposed only where the offense is both
clear-cut and substantial.
29
Dual Prosecution
The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution does
not protect against prosecution by a state or by the federal government
following conviction oi acquittal on the same charge by the other
jurisdiction.3" The Wisconsin statutes, however, specifically prohibit
dual prosecutions. 31 Section 939.71 provides that conviction or acquittal
on the merits under the law of another jurisdiction will preclude sub-
sequent prosecution by Wisconsin unless the law of either jurisdiction
requires proof of a fact not required by the other jurisdiction.
The elements of the tax crimes and the proof required for con-
viction are essentially the same under both Wisconsin and federal law.
The filing of a Wisconsin income tax return, however, is an act entirely
independent of the filing of a federal return. Technically, therefore,
separate offenses are involved. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable
that a liberal construction of section 939.71 would preclude a prosecu-
tion under Wisconsin law where the federal tax crime involves essen-
tially the same items of omitted gross income or overstated deduc-
tions.3
2
Conviction on a federal tax charge apparently will not deter Wis-
consin from prosecuting a similar crime for the same year.33 It is
believed that the announced policy should be reconsidered so as to give
effect to the legislative purpose underlying the statutory prohibition.
The federal government does have an administrative policy de-
signed to discourage dual prosecution, despite the absence of any con-
stitutional or statutory prohibition. The Attorney General has cau-
tioned United States Attorneys to exercise the right of dual prosecution
"only for compelling reasons.' ' 34 Such prosecutions are to be instituted
29Lipton & Petrie, The Substantial Understatement Requirement in Criminal
Tax Fraud Cases, N.Y.U. 19Tr INST. ON FED. TAX. 1175, 1181-1182 (1961).
30 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) ; Bartkus v. Illinois, 359, U.S.
121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). See Balter, Dual
Prosecutions, 1959 CALIF. S.B.J. 777.
31 WIS. STAT. § 939.71 (1961) : "If an act forms the basis for a crime punishable
under more than one statutory provision of this state or under a statutory
provision of this state and the laws of another jurisdiction, a conviction or
acquittal on the merits under one provision bars a subsequent prosecution
under the other provision unless each provision requires proof of a fact
for conviction which the other does not require."
32 See the comment by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Bartkus v. Illinois, supra
note 30, at 138.
33Address by George Coming, former Director of the Intelligence Section, at
the Marquette University Institute on Taxation, October 12, 1962. This com-
ment was not reiterated in the printed proceedings. See Corning, Functions
and Procedures of the Intelligence Section of the Wisconsin Department of
Taxation, MARQ. UNIV. 13TH IN ST. ON TAX. 155 (1962).
3a See Balter, supra note 30, at 784, quoting press announcement by Attorney
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only where the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the appropriate
-division and the Attorney General himself feel that federal prosecu-
tion following state prosecution is fully justified.3 5
Investigative Procedure
Most criminal investigations grow out of routine audits. If the
Audit Division uncovers evidence of fraud, the case may be referred
to the Intelligence Section for consideration of criminal prosecution.
Some investigations are initiated by the Intelligence Section. The special
agent normally will conduct a substantial investigation through third
party sourcei before he contacts the taxpayer personally.
The taxpayer is notified by letter that a special agent is conducting
an investigation before he is requested to furnish any records or in-
formation.3 6 This letter notifies the taxpayer of the reason for the in-
vestigation and advises him explicitly that the function of the Intel-
ligence Section is to determine whether the facts warrant criminal
prosecution. The initial notice will invite the taxpayer to appear for a
conference with his books and records. If the taxpayer ignores this
request, or advises the special agent that he will not produce his records,
a subpoena will be issued.3 7 An enforcement action will be commenced
if the taxpayer fails to appear in response to the subpoena.38 No attempt
will be made to compel compliance with the subpoena if the taxpayer
does appear but refuses to produce his records in reliance upon his
privilege against self-incrimination.
I The Intelligence Section will not make further contact with the tax-
payer or his representative if there is no cooperation or if the taxpayer
furnishes only information obtainable from third parties. At the con-
clusion of the investigation, the special agent files a report, without
General William P. Rogers, based on memorandum to U.S. Attorneys' meet-
ing in Washington, D.C.
3t Ibid.
36 References in the text to the procedures of the Intelligence Section are based
upon remarks by the former Director, George Corning, in articles cited notes
23 & 33 supra, amplified in one or two instances by oral remarks not in-
corporated in the text of the Marquette article.
3 The Intelligence Section purports to issue subpoenas under authority of
WIs. STAT. §§ 73.04(3), 325.01(4) (1961). See also Wis. STAT. §§ 73.03(9),
71.11(20) (b) (1961).
3S WIs. STAT. §§ 73.04(1), 325.12 (1961). The Attorney General is authorized
under § 73.04(1) to institute contempt proceedings. The witness may be
brought into court by arrest pursuant to an attachment under § 325.12. Where
there is substantial doubt as to the validity of the subpoena or its demands,
the recalcitrant witness would be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be
heard before a court would commit him for contempt. State ex rel. St. Mary's
Hosp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 250 Wis. 516, 27 N.W. 2d 478 (1947). In the
absence of a court order enforcing compliance, an administrative agency has
no power to punish for contempt. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894);
Shasta Minerals & Chem. Co. v. SEC, 328 F. 2d 285 (10th Cir. 1964). En-
forcement procedures under the Internal Revenue Code were discussed and
clarified by the Supreme Court in Reisman v. Caplin, 84 Sup. Ct. 508 (1964).
See also Lipton, Procedural Aspects of the Subpoena Power, N.Y.U. 16TH
INST. ON, FED. TAX. 1087, 1092-1098 (1958).
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recommendation, with the Director of the Intelligence Section. The
Director will grant a conference only to taxpayers who have cooperated.
He decides whether or not prosecution is warranted, but a recommen-
dation in favor of prosecution must be approved by the Commissioner
and Assistant Commissioner before a complaint is signed.
Exchange of Information
Wisconsin is one of twenty-eight states that have entered into
agreements with the Internal Revenue Service for the mutual exchange
of tax information. 9 State tax returns and audit reports are open to
examination by the Service to the extent that similar rights of exami-
nation are accorded by the federal government. 0 Accordingly, an ex-
amination of the access rights granted by the Internal Revenue Service
should indicate what inspection privileges are granted by the Depart-
ment of Taxation.
41
The Internal Revenue Service has authorized inspection of ex-
aminer's reports which have been furnished to the taxpayer.42 Confi-
dential reports for service use only and conference reports may not be
inspected. Workpapers of examiners, cover letters of reports in which
opinions are expressed, reports of special agents, and interoffice com-
munications may not be inspected without specific authorization from
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The taxpayer's representative should assume that substantially all
information furnished to either government eventually will be made
available to the other. It is unlikely that a criminal prosecution could
or would be attempted solely upon the basis of information obtained
through the exchange program, but the task of building a criminal case
will be greatly facilitated by the resulting clues, leads, and admissions.
Investigatie Authority
The Department of Taxation and the Assessor of Incomes are
authorized by statute to examine any books, papers, recordings, or
memoranda bearing on the income of the person under investigation, to
require the production of such records or the attendance of any person
having knowledge, and to take testimony.4 3 Inasmuch as this authority
is granted "for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any re-
turn or ... making a determination of the taxable income," the statu-
tory provision may authorize investigations only for the purpose of
determining the civil tax liability.
44
39 Erickson, Increasing Federal-State Exchange of Tax Data Strengthens IRS
Enforcement Program, 20 J. TAXATION 243 (1964).
40 Wis. STAT. § 71.11(44) (c) (4) (1961).
41 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6103(b) ; Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(b)-1 (1963) ; Rev.
Proc. 62-18, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 408, 413.42 Rev. Proc. 62-18, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 408, 413.
4 3 WIS. STAT. § 71.11 (20) (b) (1961).
41. See Lipton & Petrie, Subpoena Powers of the Internal Revenue Service,
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There is no statutory provision which specifically authorizes or
requires criminal investigations by the Department of Taxation. The
Department maintains that such authority is granted implicitly by
section 73.04(3), entitled "Special Investigations.."45 That section pro-
vides that the Department may appoint any employee to investigate
and report to it "upon any matter upon which the department is re-
quired to act." The appointed employee is authorized to hold hearings,
administer oaths, take testimony, and perform all other necessary
duties.
The subpoena power may be exercised only to the extent and in
the manner clearly authorized by statute.4 6 The extent to which an
administrative agency may utilize the subpoena power in conducting
a criminal investigation has not been clearly established by the case
law. In the absence of clear-cut statutory authorization, there is con-
siderable support for the view that the administrative subpoena may
not be used to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution.4 7
Under the Internal Revenue Code, most cases hold that the existence
of a criminal investigation will not preclude issuance of a subpoena
if the civil tax liability is also under investigation..48A very recent de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court, however, suggests that en-
forcement of an IRS summons may be challenged on the ground that
the "material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence
for use in a criminal prosecution.
'49
Limitations on Investigative Authority
The right to investigate is not without limitations, even if the De-
partment of Taxation may investigate and issue subpoenas for criminal
purposes. The statute authorizes only the inspection of records bear-
TUL. UNIV. 11TH TAX INST. 108, 116-20 (1962), discussing the comparable
provisions of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
45 WIS. STAT. § 73.04(3) (1961): "The department of taxation may appoint any
employe to act for it to investigate and make report to the department upon
any matter upon which the department is required to act, and such employe
shall have authority to hold hearings, administer oaths, take testimony and
perform all other duties necessary to bring such matter before the depart-
ment for final adjudication and determination."
46United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland,
315 U.S. 357 (1942) ; Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
47Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 230 (1960); Jones v. SEC, supra
note 46, at 27; United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953) ;
Application of Myers, 202 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See also Hubner
v. Tucker, 245 F. 2d 35, 39 (9th Cir. 1957), where the court declared that the
Internal Revenue Service "is not the arm of a court, as is a grand jury." In
a footnote to this remark, the court stated that the "grand jury is an in-
strumentality of a court, which has general jurisdiction over crimes sup-
posed or alleged to have been committed. An executive agency has no such
power. The agency is bound by the limitations of the statute." Id. at 39 n. 6.4
8 Boren v. Tucker, 239 F. 2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F. 2d
185 (1st Cir. 1959); In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 F. 2d 12(2d Cir. 1962); Badger Meter Mfg. Co. v. Brennan, 216 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.
Wis. 1962).
49 Reisman v. Caplin, supra note 38, at 513.
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ing on the income of the person under investigation." This provision
'robably limits inspection to evidence that is relevant and material.
51
Other important restrictions are found in the traditional constitutional
privileges against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and
seizures. The privileges attaching to confidential communications be-
tween parties to certain relationships also imposes significant limita-
tions.
In order to give meaningful effect to the statute of limitations,
examination of years barred by the normal four year statute of limita-
tions should not be permitted unless the state can show reasonable
grounds for suspecting fraud or that less than 75% of the taxable in-
come was reported.52 There are no Wisconsin cases bearing on this
point. Federal law has been conflicting with respect to both the exist-
ence and nature of any such special requirement, 53 but should be highly
persuasive when the issue has been resolved. Clarification will be forth-
coming soon in a case pending before the United States Supreme
Court.5
4
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The federal and state constitutions both provide that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self"5 5 In a very recent reversal of long-standing precedent, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that the privilege against self-
incrimination granted by the fifth amendment to the federal constitu-
tion may be invoked in state proceedings.5 6 Equally important, in both
federal and state proceedings, possible incrimination under the laws of
either jurisdiction is now a proper basis for claiming the federal privi-
lege.57
It is well-settled under federal law that the privilege against self-
incrimination protects both taxpayers and third parties.58 It may be
50 WIs. STAT. § 71.11(20) (b) (1961).
51 See Lipton & Petrie, supra note 44, at 122-23, discussing interpretations under
federal law.
52 Notice of additional assessment ordinarily must be served within four years
of the date the tax return was filed. Wis. STAT. § 71.11(21) (bin) (1961).
No statute of limitations applies if an incorrect return has been made with
intent to defeat or evade the tax, or if no return has been filed. Wis. STAT.§ 71.11(21) (c) (1961). The statute of limitations is extended to six years if
less than 75% of the correct net taxable income has been reported and the
additional tax exceeds $100. Wis STAT. § 71.11(21) (g) (1961).
53 The divergent views are discussed in the following cases: DeMasters v.
Arend, 313 F. 2d 79, 88 n. 28 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Application of United States
(Carroll), 246 F. 2d 762 (2d Cir. 1957); McDermott v. John Baumgarth
Co., 286 F. 2d 864 (7th Cir. 1961).
54United States v. Ryan, 320 F. 2d 500 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 84 Sup.
Ct. 658 (1964) (No. 590).
55 U.S. CONST. amend. V; WIs. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.56 Malloy v. Hogan, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4507 (U.S. June 15, 1964).
57 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4518 (U.S. June 15, 1964).
58 The scope and application of the privilege against self-incrimination in federal
tax investigations are discussed in KOSTELANETZ & BENDER, CRIMINAL ASPECTS
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claimed during any stage of the investigation and protects individuals
from being compelled to give incriminating answers or to produce
personal or private records. An individual who testifies or produces
records on one occasion without claiming the privilege may subsequently
claim his privilege when he is again asked to testify or produce. Of
course, the privilege is waived with respect to any information that
may have been garnered from the first disclosures.
Production of Records
Most cases arising under the Internal Revenue Code hold or assume
that the records of an individual are protected by the privilege against
self-incrimination. 9 Nevertheless, concern has been expressed about
possible application of the required-records doctrine,6 0 and there has
been dicta in several court of appeals decisions to the effect that such
records are not privileged because required by law.6 ' The Internal
Revenue Service, however, has always respected the privileged char-
acter of income tax records. There is no indication that it will attempt
to have the required-records doctrine applied.
To date, the policy of the Department of Taxation has been the
same as that of the Internal Revenue Service. Moreover, there is a
significant difference in the statutory provisions that reduces the pos-
sibility that the required-records doctrine might be applied in Wiscon-
sin. The Wisconsin statutes, in contrast to the Internal Revenue Code,
only require that income tax records be kept after notice is served on
the taxpayer to keep such records. 2
The constitutional protection against self-incrimination does not
protect corporations or large unincorporated associations,63 and it may
not protect certain limited partnerships. 4 Normally, the custodian of
OF TAX FRAUD CASES 47-55 (1957) ; BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION §§ 5.4-1
to -7 (3d ed. 1963); Lipton, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights in Tax Fraud
Investigations, 32 TAXES 263 (1954).
59 See cases cited and discussed in Lipton, Record Keeping and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1331, 1333-35
(1956).
60 Meltzer, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Required Income Tax
Records, 30 TAXES 45 (1952).
61 See Falsone v. United States, 205 F. 2d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 1953); United
States v. Clancy, 276 F. 2d 617, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds,
365 U.S. 312 (1961) ; Beard v. United States, 222 F. 2d 84, 93 (4th Cir. 1955).
See also Application of Howard, 210 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Pa. 1962); United
States v. Bouschor, 200 F. Supp. 541, 542-43 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd on other
grounds, 316 F. 2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp.
365, 368 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
62 WIS. STAT. § 71.11 (10) (1961).
63 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911) ; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) ; Curcio v. United States,
354 U.S. 118 (1957).
64 The records of limited partnerships having 25 to 147 limited partners were
held not privileged in United States v. Silverstein, 314 F. 2d 789 (2d Cir.
1963). Records of ordinary common-law partnerships generally are con-
sidered privileged. United States v. Linen Serv. Council, 141 F. Supp. 511(D.N.J. 1956); United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);
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corporate records held in an official capacity may not decline to pro-
duce them on the ground that their contents may tend to incriminate
him personally.65 A recent court of appeals case, however, permitted
the president and sole stockholder of a corporation to invoke his privi-
lege with respect to corporate records. [Editor's note: As this article
went to press, the court reversed itself on rehearing. 6 ] Earlier cases had
held to the contrary.6
7
Irrespective of the right to assert the constitutional privilege, both
the officer having possession of records and the corporation may assert
the defense that the state has no authority to issue subpoenas during
an investigation for criminal purposes.6 8 Assuming that production of
the records may be compelled, a corporate officer may not be forced
to testify with respect to their contents.69
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The Wisconsin constitution provides the same protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures as is found in the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 0 As a result of the holding in
Mapp v. Ohio,7 1 moreover, it is now clear that evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment by either state or federal agents
may not be used in a criminal prosecution by either government.7 2
In contrast to the privilege against self-incrimination, the guarantee
against unreasonable searches extends to corporations as well as indi-
viduals. 73 In the absence of valid legal process, an examination of the
taxpayer's records is not lawful unless made with the taxpayer's con-
sent, freely and voluntarily given.74 An examination without the tax-
It re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948); United
States v. Brasley, 268 Fed. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1920). Contra, United States v.
Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Onassis, 125
F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954).
65 Wilson v. United States, supra note 63.
66 Wild v. Brewer, 329 F. 2d 924, rev'd on rehearing, CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (64-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 59535 (9th Cir. 1964).
67United States v. Fago, 319 F. 2d 791 (2d Cir. 1963) ; In re Greenspan, 187
F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
68 See discussion in text infra, at notes 46 to 49.
69 Curcio v. United States, supra note 63.
70 Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
71367 U.S. 643 (1961).
72 In Wisconsin, a motion to suppress such evidence generally must be made
before trial. Wis. STAT. § 955.09 (1961).
73 FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); Essgee Co. v. United
States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923) ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186(1946) ; In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., supra note 48, at 16.
74Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, supra note 46, at 364; Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921). See also the following income tax cases:
United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 255 F. 2d 394 (7th Cir. 1955), remanded
on other grounds, 355 U.S. 233 (1957) ; Matter of Bodkin, 165 F. Supp. 25
(E.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y.
1955) ; United States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953), modified,
126 F. Supp. 609 (1955) ; United States v. Wolrich, 129 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
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payer's consent constitutes an illegal search. Flagrant examples include
a surreptitious inspection of records not specifically made available to
the agent, 5 and an examination of earlier years under the pretext that
current years were being examined.7 c A federal district court re-
cently held that delivery of records to an agent by an accountant,
without the owner's knowledge or consent, constituted an unlawful
seizure.
77
Consent that is coerced or induced by misrepresentation, fraud,
trickery, or promises is invalid, and evidence obtained under such
circumstances is subject to suppression."8 The coercion that negatives
consent may be of a subtle variety. In Lord v. Kelley,7 9 a district court
held that the delivery of records was not voluntary where a special
agent told an accountant that it would be prudent for him to cooperate
unless he himself wished to get into trouble.
Examination of the taxpayer's records by a revenue agent who re-
ceives behind-the-scene directions from a special agent has been de-
nounced as trickery in several federal cases.80 It is unlikely that Wis-
consin agents will resort to this technique in view of the announced
policy that the taxpayer will be given advance notice in writing that
a criminal investigation is in process.8'
The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures also
protects the taxpayer against unauthorized, arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unduly burdensome investigative demands, including those formalized
by a subpoena.8 2 A subpoena duces tecum may be constitutionally ob-
jectionable if it is too broad in scope, too burdensome in its demands,
lacks particularity in description, or requests irrelevant items.8 3 These
limitations have not been highly significant in federal investigations, 4
and it is doubtful that the scope of state tax examinations will be re-
stricted to any greater extent.
Privileged Communications
The Wisconsin statutes and the common law protect against com-
75United States v. Young, 215 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Mich. 1963).76Application of Leonardo, 208 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1962); see also Reine-
man v. United States, 301 F. 2d 267 (7th Cir. 1962).77 Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963).
78Gouled v. United States, supra note 74; see also cases cited in Lipton &
Petrie, supra note 44, at nn. 106, 107 & 116.
79 Note 77 supra.
so United States v. Lipshitz, supra note 74; Matter of Bodkin, supra note 74;
United States v. Wolrich, supra note 74; United States v. Wheeler, 149 F.
Supp. 445 (W.D. Pa. 1957), rezvd on other grounds, 256 F. 2d 745 (3d Cir.
1958).
81 Coming, supra note 23, at 15.
82 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra note 73. Recent interpreta-
tions in non-tax cases include Adams v. FTC, 296 F. 2d 861 (8th Cir. 1961);
Shasta Minerals & Chem. Co. v. SEC, supra note 38.
83 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra note 73.
84 See Lipton & Petrie, supra note 44, at 132-35.
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pulsory disclosure of certain confidential communications.8 5 Confes-
sions to a clergyman or minister, private communications between hus-
band and wife, disclosures to a doctor for professional purposes, and
communications by a client to an attorney in his professional capacity
are all privileged. The privilege may be waived only by the party who
made the confidential disclosure.
There is no common law or statutory privilege attaching to com-
munications between accountant and client.8 As a result, legal repre-
sentation is imperative in criminal tax investigations. The taxpayer
may confide in his attorney with confidence, whereas an accountant may
be compelled to disclose incriminating admissions made by his client.
If the services of an accountant are essential, he should be engaged for
the express purpose of aiding the attorney or assisting the taxpayer in
communicating with his attorney. Recent case law promises protection
under these circumstances, though the question is still shadowed with
some doubt.81
The attorney-client privilege is not as broad as generally believed,
and numerous questions still require judicial clarification in the tax
field.8
The Cooperation Dilemma
No attempt will be made to discuss fully the arguments for and
against cooperation in tax investigations. The decision with respect to
cooperation can be made only in the context of the particular factual
situation presented. In the federal tax field, experience has demon-
strated the ironic truth that the cooperative taxpayer generally fares
much worse than the individual who relies upon his constitutional
rights.8 9 The State Intelligence Section will take cooperation into ac-
count in evaluating intent and determining whether to recommend
prosecution, but cooperation in itself will not preclude prosecution.9 °
Unlike most other crimes, it seldom is possible for the government
to support a prosecution for tax evasion unless the taxpayer has co-
operated during the investigation. The government may be unable to
85 Wis. STAT. §§ 325.18 (husband and wife), .20 (clergyman and confessor), .21
(doctor and patient), .22 (attorney and client) (1961). The statute provides
that the privilege does not apply to communications made to the attorney for
the purpose of being communicated to another or being made public.
86 See Lipton, Privileged Communications, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
955, 961 (1955).
87 See United States v. Judson, 322 F. 2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) ; United States v.
Kovel, 296 F. 2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
88 For a general discussion of the subject, see Lipton, supra note 96; Orkin, The
Attorney Client Privilege in Tax Matters, 49 A.B.A.J. 794 (1963) ; Lipton
& Petrie, supra note 44, at 141; Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer
and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications
Doctrine, 71 YALE L. J. 1226 (1962).
89 See Lipton, The Taxpayer Under Fraud Investigation: Suggestions for Effec-
tive Representation, 47 A.B.A.J. 265 (1961) ; Lipton, The Taxpayer's Rights:
Investigation of Tax Fraud Cases, 42 A.B.A.J. 325 (1956).
90 Corning, supra note 23, at 16.
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establish understatements of income without access to the taxpayer's
books and records. Resort to the net worth method may be equally
unsuccessful without the taxpayer's cooperation. Even if net income
can be reconstructed independently, the government may be unable to
prove that the understatements were due to fraud, rather than to
neglect, mistake, bookkeeping inadequacies, or similar causes.91
In federal investigations, the taxpayer can refuse all cooperation
and still utilize many conference opportunities to present defensive evi-
dence or to argue the weaknesses in the Government's case. The. State
Intelligence Section, however, will not grant a conference unless the
taxpayer cooperates fully.92 This undoubtedly means that he must sub-
mit not only all of his books and records relating to income and de-
ductions, but also that he will be required to submit everything pertin-
ent to a net worth determination. The taxpayer probably will also be
required to submit to questioning under oath.
Realistically, cooperation may benefit the taxpayer only if he can
prove his innocence. It may supply the Department with the proof
necessary to make a case. If by chance the taxpayer should gain some
advantage with the state through cooperation, he may seriously jeopar-
dize his position in any subsequent federal investigation.
Notwithstanding the inherent dangers in cooperation, it is unlikely
that most representatives will be willing to forego conference oppor-
tunities. The inclination to cooperate probably will be reinforced by
the belief that willingness to settle the civil liability will prevent a prose-
cution. The Internal Revenue Service has a strict policy which fore-
closes any discussion of the civil liability while criminal prosecution is
under consideration. The clear-cut separation of the criminal and civil
functions may not exist under Wisconsin procedures. The former
Director has stated that a conference may be utilized to "make settle-
ment offers, discuss pleas, ask for reduction in the number of proposed
counts, ask for a reduction to a lesser charge, etc." 93
The greatest danger in the state's policy with respect to lack of co-
operation is that it may be allowed to raise an unjustifiable implication
of guilt. Regardless of the suspicion that may be engendered by lack
of cooperation in federal tax investigations, criminal prosecutions are
never based upon suspicion. Both the Internal Revenue Service and
the Justice Department give great weight to any presentation in behalf
of the taxpayer even though there has been a complete lack of co-
operation.
The Department of Taxation presumably will exercise requisite re-
straint, whether or not the taxpayer cooperates. It is doubtful, however,
91 See Lipton & Petrie, Representation in Net Worth Cases, 42 MARIQ. L. REV.
504, 507 (1959).
92 Coming, supra note 23, at 16.
93 Ibid. ,
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that the Department will be able to appraise adequately the weaknesses in
its cases without giving the taxpayer's representative an opportunity to
state his position. Assuming that the Department prosecutes only flagrant
and clear-cut cases and does not attach undue significance to lack of co-
operation, the taxpayer may benefit greatly by the present conference
policy. It simplifies the problem of representation and gives the tax-
payer's representative a clear choice. He need not subject his client to
the risks of partial cooperation or even the danger of admissions dur-
ing conferences.
